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EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EFFECT OF DIVORCE JUDGMENTS IN RELATION
TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
A contribution to a contemporary, in speaking of the decision
in the famous case of Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S., 562, con-
cludes with the statement that the decision is opposed to reason,
to authority, and to morality, but that it will stand until the ques-
tion is raised again. This remark expressed the thought that
was uppermost in the mind of the legal profession generally. And
so it is with the deepest interest that the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Thompson v. Thompson
has been received. 33 Sup. Ct. Reptr., 129.
The plaintiff and defendant were married in Virginia and
established the matrimonial domicile in that state. Thereafter
the wife left home and took up her abode in the District of
Columbia, where in November, 1907, she commenced a suit for
maintenance, charging the husband with cruel treatment of such
a character as to compel her to leave him. The husband was
served with process. But meanwhile, before this, in September,
1907, he had brought an action for divorce a mensa et thoro on
the ground of desertion without cause. An order of publication
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having been made, and the wife failing to appear and defend,
the Virginia court granted the divorce in October, 1907. The
husband set up this decree in bar of the wife's suit for main-
tenance. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
it was held that the courts of the state which is the domicile of the
husband, and the only matrimonial domicile, have jurisdiction to
render a decree of divorce in his favor, although the wife has left
that jurisdiction and service has been made upon her only by
publication, and such a decree, under the "'full faith and credit"
clause of the Federal Constitution, is entitled to recognition in
another state.
Without devoting too much time to reviewing the 'Haddock
case and that of Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S., 155, the prin-
ciples of which the Haddock case was supposed to have over-
thrown, it is desirable to have before us a brief summary of the
reasoning employed in reaching the decision in the Haddock case.
First, it was held that for a divorce to be valid the libellant must
be domiciled in the state wherein the divorce is sought; second,
that there must be personal jurisdiction over the libellee, in order
for the decree to be entitled to full faith and credit in the courts
of the state wherein the libellee resides; third, that failure to
obtain such personal jurisdiction over the libellee will not deprive
the decree of its validity in the state where rendered.
The facts and the conclusion of the court in the Atherton case
are precisely the same as in the principal case, and it will be
remembered that in the former it was held that a Kentucky
decree of divorce in favor of a husband there domiciled, was
entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution, although
the wife was domiciled in New York and was never served with
process. To quote from the opinion: "The rule as to the notice
necessary to give full effect to a decree of divorce is different
from that which is required in suits in personam." This was in
fact a finding that a divorce suit is a proceeding in rem, and that
the res was an indivisible res over which the Kentucky courts,
by reason of their finding that the wife had wrongfully left the
matrimonial domicile therein situated, had retained complete
jurisdiction.
Now while the circumstances in the Haddock case were some-
what different from those in the Atherton case, the court pro-
ceeded along entirely different lines in reaching its conclusion,
holding that a suit for divorce brought in a state other than that
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of the domicile of matrimony, against a wife who is still domi-
ciled therein, is not a proceeding in rem justifying the court in
entering a decree as to the res, or marriage relation, that is en-
titled to recognition in other jurisdictions. This necessarily
means that the court understands the proceedings to be in per-
sonam, and that inasmuch as the husband had wrongfully left
the matrimonial domicile he could not establish it in another state
and by divorce proceedings commenced there, bind the wife with-
out her actual appearance. Had the court stopped with this
statement the decision would have been a long step toward solv-
ing the difficulties attendant upon divorce litigation. But the
morally uplifting effect of this part of the decision was nullified
by the further observation that the decree was valid in the state
where rendered. Perhaps this is the natural consequence of
holding that divorce proceedings are in personam, and hence are
analogous to proceedings in debt against a person outside of the
jurisdiction. In such cases, of course, it is elementary that
property of the debtor within the jurisdiction of the court ren-
dering the decree may be subjected to execution on a judg-
ment against, the debtor, even if he fails to appear and defend.
But we submit that the cases are too widely different to admit of
such an analogy.
Inasmuch as the decision in the principal case is based upon
the two cases herein discussed, our remarks concerning them may
be considered as directly applying to the principal case as well.
Considering the views expressed in both decisions, the one that
the proceedings are strictly in personam, the other that they are
in rem, we reach equally unsatisfactory results. If in rem the
decision can be justified only on the ground that the res, the mar-
riage status, remained in the state with the wrongfully abandoned
spouse, while the one who wrongfully leaves takes with him none
of the incidents of marriage. This is absurd from a logical
standpoint.
Can we justify a decree on the ground that the proceedings
are in personam? We think not. For in that event the validity
of the decree in the state where rendered rests upon the fact
that the requirement of personal appearance is satisfied by sub-
stituted service or service by publication. Let us suppose that
instead of obtaining service in either of these forms the court
had issued a writ commanding an officer of the court to go into
the state where the other party to the proceedings was domiciled,
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seize him, and bring the body before the court. A decree based
upon such proceedings would be absolutely void. And yet by
allowing service by publication does not the court do indirectly
what it cannot do directly?
Throughout this whole line of decisions the object of the
courts has been a most commendable one, viz., to check the
lamentable increase in divorces where the principles of jurisdic-
tion have been so loosely applied. But it is to be regretted that
in so doing the courts could not feel free to meet the situation
as it actually is, and declare once and for all time that a suit for
divorce is a proceeding in rem that can be prosecuted only in the
state of the matrimonial domicile; and further, that the relation
of husband and wife can be dissolved only when both parties are
actually before the court. And by matrimonial domicile we
mean that place wherein both parties to the nuptial contract reside
as husband and wife, or in cases of desertion, the domicile of the
wrongfully abandoned spouse. We are aware that this would
necessarily result in the dismissal of many suits that are other-
wise meritoriously brought and where perhaps the person seeking
the decree has ample grounds for desiring a legal separation, but
we submit that only in some such manner as has been suggested
can the courts escape the maze of intricacies that entangles them
and reach a solution of the difficulties that these recent decisions
have raised.
Mr. Justice Pitney's opinion in the principal case is probably
supported by the weight of authority, but in its attempt to explain
the questions left open by the former decisions, it is a disappoint-
ment.
MAY A PATENTEE LIMIT BY NOTICE THE PRICE AT WHICH FUTURE
RETAILERS MUST SELL AN ARTICLE?
In the recent case of Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 33 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 616, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to
determine the extent of a patentee's rights in an article which he
had sold. In that case, the appellees owned letters patent cov-
ering 'Sanatogen' which was sold in packages each bearing a
notice to the effect that anyone who sold the package for less than
$1.00, or used it when so sold, would be dealt with as an infringer
of the patentee's rights. The appellee, proprietor of a retail
drug store, purchased 'Sanatogen' from brokers who had pur-
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chased of appellant's sole licensee, and sold same for less than
$1.00. The appellants seek to restrain him from continuing
such sales. The court held that the remedy should not be al-
lowed. Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice
Lurton, and Mr. Justice Van Devanter dissented.
The right to make, use, and vend an invention always belonged
to the inventor and was never dependent upon statute. But
the exclusive right to make, use, and vend, upon which the ap-
pellant relies was conferred by statute. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
p. 3381. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 Howard, 539. In this case
Chief Justice Taney said: "The franchise which the patent grants
consists altogether in the right to exclude everyone from making,
using, or vending the thing patented." In Patterson v. Kentucky,
97 U. S., 501, it is said: "The sole operation of the statute is to
enable him (the patentee) to prevent others from using the pro-
ducts of his labor except with his consent. But his own right of
using is not enlarged or affected."
That the inventor of an article not patented cannot, by agree-
ment obtain the object sought by the appellant in the principal
case has been decided by the United States Supreme Court. Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S., 373.
But the rights secured by the statute to a patentee are property
rights and entitled to the same sanctions as other property. Con-
tinental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S., 405.
The precise question presented by the principal case had not
arisen before under the patent act, but a simlar question had been
adjudicated under the copyright act, which secures to a holder
of a copyright the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing,
completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending the article
copyrighted. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S., 339. In
that case it was sought to limit by a notice, substantially the same
as that in the principal case, the price at which books must be
sold at retail. Mr. Justice Day, delivering the unanimous opin-
ion of the Court, said: "The owner of the copyright in this case
did sell copies of the book in quantities and at a price satisfactory
to it. What the complainant contends for embraces not only
the right to sell the copies, but to qualify the title of a future pur-
chaser by the reservation of the right to have the remedies of
the statute against an infringer because of the printed notice of its
purpose to do so unless the purchaser sells at a price fixed in the
notice. To add to the right of exclusive sale, the authority to
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control all futurt retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be
made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms
of the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by con-
struction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with a view to
ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment."
There is a necessary difference between the copyright act and
the patent act, because of the difference in the subject matter to
be protected, the most striking difference being the omission of
the word 'use' in the former. Nevertheless there is a strong
similarity, due to the identity of intention in the legislature en-
acting, namely, to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts.
As regards the position of a seller of a book and a seller of a
package of "Sanatogen", where each has sought by notice in sub-
stantially the same terms to impose a limitation, and where neither
has any interest in the proceeds of subsequent sales, it cannot be
reasonably maintained that there is any substantial difference
so far as interest is concerned, or that the legislature intended
to confer rights differing in nature or extent, when in the copy-
right act it gave to the former the exclusive right of 'vending' and
when in the patent act it gave to the latter the exclusive right to
"'vend." Nor does it seem reasonable that the intention of the
seller differs in the two cases. In each case he intends to part
with the thing for a consideration. He has then exercised the
right to vend, and having exercised it, the additional restriction
sought to be imposed is not within the right which the legislature
intended to confer.
The United States Supreme Court has held, in a line of un-
broken decisions, that a patentee who had parted with a patented
article by passing title to a purchaser, has placed the article be-
yond the limits of the monopoly. Bloomer v. McQuewan, supra;
Goodyear v. Beverly Rubber Co., 1 Cliff., 348, 354; Chafee v.
Boston Belting Co., 22 Howard, 217, 223; Adams v. Burke, 17
Wall., 453; Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U. S., 659.
Expressing an opinion representative of this group of cases, the
Court in the Goodyear Case says: "Having manufactured the
material and sold it for a satisfactory compensation, whether as
material, or in the form of a manufactured article, the patentee,
so far as that quantity of his invention is concerned, has enjoyed
all the rights secured to him under his letters patent, and the
manufactured article and the material of which it is composed,
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go to the purchaser for a valuable consideration, discharged of
all the rights previously attached to it, or impressed upon it, by
the act of Congress under which the patent was granted."
There being no dissenting opinions written by the dissenting
judges, it is not easy to discover the ground upon which they
base their dissent. An examination of the authorities, however,
convinces that the decision of the majority gives effect to the
intention of the legislature which enacted the patent law.
